Safety towards and with gem based APM
The advent of gemstone based APM (gem-gum-tec) will come with many dangers and opportunities.
Early misdirected overregulation can increase risk rather than mitigating it.
Government bending to public outcry from ill informed fear
without a proper understanding of the matter can backfire.
- research can be driven underground (including under the cover of corporate proprietary trade secrecy)
- access to early technology can limit access to new technology and foster social spread & two class society
There has been a somewhat related incident that
may have delayed the development towards gem based APM notably (without any benefits on safety).
It was not exactly overregulation by government-decreed law but
it was overzealous internal governance policy of a federal research program/agency.
See: The negative effects that public overexcitement can have and History
Safety in a world with AP manufacturing and technology
is a lot about about governance and related software technology rather than physical technology.
There are some physical technology aspects too, yes, but these alone can't suffice.
Note that:
- Discussion of runaway replication accidents is massively over-represented. And risk are typically overestimated.
- Discussion of specialized weaponry is massively under-represented. And risk are typically underestimated.
Contents
Specialized offensive weaponry
There is a serious dilemma here.
Discussing these things kind of overlaps with developing them or at least giving hints on how these could be developed.
As such the author is hesitant to invest effort in deeper research and more in depth explanations.
It would be highly speculative at this point anyway.
Just to give a superficial overview.
Especially high threat levels may be posed by the following:
But only once the technology is there.
- insect to bird sized drones (bigger size makes them very fast in speed and accelerations despite air)
- microcomponent maintenance microbots applied maliciously (e.g. spying, sabotage, …)
- weapons employing high amplitude sound shockwaves against humans (all too trivially easy to generate)
- weapons employing EMP waves against unhardened machines
- long range energy weapons like lasers and microwave
especially in space (effectiveness of a nuke, precision of a scalpel) - complex multi unit multi scale systems
Purely defensive weaponry
Shields against high velocity impacts may fall in this category.
This involves environmental observation and active measures taken on impending impacts that are
both smarter and more effective than existing countermeasures like conter-explosions and hypervelocity whiffle shields.
Ultra high power densities of gem-gum systems may allows for directed counter of projectiles
so long the heat capacity can take the waste heat.
Proliferation – nuclear and chemical – actions of rouge individuals
The worries
A worry here is that gemstone based on-chip factories will make it easy to separate isotopes
concentrate fissile isotopes and allow any random rouge individual to build a nuke all by themselves in secrecy.
Several things here:
- To gain sufficient fissile material one still needs to go through quite an amount of natural ore.
- Nuclear plants and nuclear waste sites with higher per-concentrated material can be well guarded.
- Such activity will elevate local radiation levels that can be detected.
- A bad nuke will be more a dirty bomb than a nuke, bad enough, yes, but way below an actual nuke by output.
Lesser on the impact side but perhaps higher on the probability side of risk are
- "mere" dirty bombs attacks and
- chemical poison attacks.
A small easy to conceal device could produces high quantities of toxic gas in a short amount of time.
Then again gas attacks are possible even today as high pressue canisters can pack copious amounts of problematic gasses.
Such attacks unfortunately and regrettably have happened in the past.
Like the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.
Supposedly the reason for why later some trash bins in subway stations were removed.
With gem-gum-tec advanced trash bins could immediately seal up and transport away to safe distance any rando stuff thrown in.
Doorways and existing train station pass-through checkpoints could also detect for radiation. This is difficult to hide.
(wiki-TODO: Compare lead shielded notable radiological material vs carrying some naturally radioactive bananas)
In summary it seems very very unlikely that every second city will be nuked every few yeas by some maniac.
There are many more factors beyond the isotope separation difficulty.
Organized groups may pose a bigger risk, but this is hardly new.
Possible regulatory measures
The following should be the exception rather than the rule.
If in any way possible a blacklist (all allowed but …) rather than a whitelist (nothing allowed but …).
The following stands in contrast to open source which always should be the default and the option considered first.
Make open sharing of critical highly dangerous information (information hazard) illegal to a high fine / prison time.
Yes, this can not give an absolute guarantee to prevent any and all leaks (via dark-web, lax clear-web, physical meetings).
but it can make the attainment of such information much much much more difficult.
Zero risk can never be attained but a very low risk can be striven for.
Also make the possession of such as hazardous classified information only legal
when the owner went through proper training receiving a license.
Misdirected efforts – Dystopial surveillance state
Making private communication that can not be surveilled illegal is not an option. Period.
Some 🤬 people are actually trying to achieve that by making end to end encryption illegal.
Worse even it could be made illegal to not carry an always turned on phone with you at all times.
Such things will do way more harm that the safety they could ever provide. Fact.
When problems are no longer properly communicated as negative feedback in the social control loop
because of self-censorship out of fear of livelyhood endangering backlash
then it's the beginning of the end of a working healthy society.
Yes there are some not removable tail risks involved when allowing for fully private communications.
But these tail risks we absolutely have to accept as facts of life. No way around it.
Runaway replication accidents – And intentional malicious release
Replicators as tool for malicious actors (unsuitable)
When intentionally optimizing for destructiveness for a terror attack
then one naturally ends up with what was discussed in the above section.
Specialized weaponry systems.
Much larger systems are much more effective and successful in self replication as:
- they can move way faster
- they can shield better against radiation like UV light
- they can pack more capability
- they can form disjunct multi unit collaborative systems where the units are task specialized
Replication safety measures
Generally safety measures can be applied at all of the six sides of the reproduction hexagon
via a combination of technical and governance mean.
(wiki-TODO: discuss all six)
Replication runaway accidents. Can they happen? And if yes how likely?
Direct path:
During the bootstrapping the proto-assembler concept is outdated (since well before 2000).
Proposed is the development via early diamondoid nanosystem pixel (direct path).
Reaching systems capable of closed cycle self replication will likely cover significant chip area.
Several sides of the replication pentagon do not hold. Especially it's 2D on a chip so …
Risk of an runaway replication accident is not present.
Incremental path:
Free floating things like the foldamer printer may look like (and be confused with) proto-assemblers
but they are actually just primitive subsystems like a site activation positional stage.
Reaching systems capable of closed cycle self replication will be much bigger and possibly (quite likely even) not monolithic.
(As of 2023 we are still far away for this capability.)
Several sides of the replication pentagon do not hold.
Especially there's a dependence on special feedstock and
these foldamer assemblies are rather fragile needing water at proper temperature and such
Risk of an runaway replication accident is not present.
Synthetic biology (NOT on the APM development path and totally different far term target):
Direct usage of living cells or creation of cell like things (that by definition can self replicate) is not involved in this pathways.
The latter would be synthetic biology. A very very different by nature strictly separate branch of technology.
For that look into existing biotech risk managenment.
Risk of an runaway replication accident is present but the scope is well known from bio-hazards.
Advanced productive nanosystems:
Replicative nanobots are an outdated concept for that.
See: Molecular assemblers as advanced productive nanosystem - outdated
Still technology is advanced enough to make them by then just for the sake to show that they can be made.
They may be more micro than nano but still invisibly small like pollen.
Risk of an runaway replication accident is present but most likely well manageable by then.
Intentional malicious use for max damage leads to weapon systems instead.
Horror scenarios of the whole biosphere being converted in mere hours are all 100% pure hype & fiction.
Even intentional say we wanted to convert the whole (unguarded) Venusian atmosphere
into safe solid silicon carbide and bind the oxygen to iron or something,
it would take centuries of highly directed effort. Alone from energetic limitations.
This would be specialized high performance replicative systems rather than replicating nanobots.
See: Grey goo horror fable
Related
- dangers (& opportunities)
